-Introduction
The Dotcom bubble and the concomitant high underpricing are two puzzles. From 2,000 points in early 1999, the NASDAQ composite index escalated to 5,048 in March 2000, returning to near the 2,000 points after 2000. The average underpricing escalated from near 15 percent in 1991 -1998 to 65 percent in 1999 -2000 (Ritter, 2014 . What is remarkable is that the high average underpricing was caused by an increase in extreme underpricing (fat right tale) rather than a parallel shift in the distribution. Histograms 1A-1D illustrate this point. 1 In the Pre-bubble period (Histogram 1A), the average underpricing was 16 percent and only 4 percent of the IPOs had underpricing above 60 percent. During the bubble (Histogram 1B), the average underpricing jumped to 66 percent, but such increase was mostly driven by extreme underpricing: 24 percent of the IPOs had underpricing above 140 percent. However, the left tale of the distribution was not much affected: 10 percent of the IPOs were overpriced and 32 percent had underpricing below 20 percent. If one winsorize the underpricing at 60 percent, the average drops to 32 percent.
Moreover, differently from what some would expect, extreme underpricing was neither exclusive nor pervasive to technology IPOs: among non-technology (technology) IPOs, 15 (26) percent had underpricing above 140% (Histogram 1C and 1D) ; and 20 percent of the technology IPOs had underpricing below 20 percent. Traditional information-based theory of underpricing (e.g., Rock, 1986; and Benveniste and Spindt, 1989) cannot explain or justify the Dotcom extreme underpricing. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that underwriters forced extreme underpricing without issuers consent.
We conjecture that the Dotcom extreme underpricing resulted from the strategic behavior of firms racing for leadership (or survivorship). For such firms, the continued use of capital market was essential. Possible overvaluation of their shares, given the overheat market, would jeopardize their future capacity to tackle the capital markets. Thus, they preferred conservative pricing, extremely underpricing their IPOs.
The birth of the Internet spurred a variety of new products and processes (the socalled New Economy). The Internet also changed the structure of many traditional businesses. For example, it allowed for improved inventory management and new manners of marketing products that fostered market consolidation in some traditional industries. It even allowed some local businesses to become global (e.g., Amazon.com). The use of new processes even raised doubt on whether these new businesses would subsume traditional ones. Such revolution brought a large cohort of new firms in a race for leadership (or survivorship). These firms needed to go public either to raise cash to fund organic growth, or to turn their shares into currency to pay for acquisitions. 2 For them the continued use of the capital markets was a need. These firms also presented abnormal realized growth rate, but their track record was short because they were young. Short record of accomplishment along with uncertainty about the effectiveness the new processes made difficult the assessment of long-term growth rates and, consequently, valuation (Schwert 2002; Schultz and Zaman, 2001 ).
Our explanation for the abnormal underpricing builds on the behavior of firms with the need for continued use of capital markets. Such firms, facing the frenzy for their shares, had reasons to be conservative in the pricing of their IPOs. First, the continued use of the stock market requires good shares performance (e.g., price returns, regular analysts' coverage and low bid-ask spreads). Shares distributed at current high price could lose their attractiveness if a market reversion occurred. Second, race for leadership required large pre-IPO capital infusion, lowering CEO's ownership. 3 Maintenance of control with small ownership requires proper shares dilution, 4 preferentially among buy-and-hold investors.
This would leave a small number of shares floating and make difficult for threatening investors to acquire significant ownership. However, underwriters would hardly place potentially overpriced shares among their premier buy-and-hold investors. Third, for an issuer intending to do a series of acquisitions, ownership dilution could come mostly from expensive acquisitions, rather than from IPO underpricing. By selling overvalued shares at their IPOs, strategic acquirers could create unrealistic expectations for acquisition 2 Brau and Fawcett (2006) examining IPOs from [2000] [2001] find that the desire to create an acquisition currency ranks as the most important reason for an IPO. Over a long sample period, Celikyurt, Sevilir, and Shivdasani (2010) report that newly public firms make acquisitions at a torrid pace.
3 Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) report that average CEO ownership dropped from 23 percent during 1996-1998 dropped to 17.3 percent in 1999 and to 11.6 percent in 2000. 4 Brennan and Franks (1997) find that when shares are placed more widely rather than placed with just a few powerful large shareholders, the entrepreneur is less easy ousted from the company.
multiples, turning acquisitions expensive. Last, venture capital (VC) sponsored firms could want to protect VCs ability to tackle underwriters, auditors, analyst and investors (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991) .
We present evidence supporting our conjecture. We show that the Dotcom underpricing can be fully accounted by issuers' strategic goals and characteristics.
Furthermore, once we control for issuers' strategy and characteristics, the presence of prestigious underwriters do not play any role in the dotcom abnormal underpricing 2004; Howe and Zhang, 2005; Ibbotson, Sindelar, and Ritter, 1994; Loughran and Ritter, 2004; Lowry and Schwert, 2002; Ritter 1984; and Yung, Colak, and Wang, 2008) This article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents our hypotheses and methodology; Section 3 describes our data, sample and variables; Section 4 presents our results; and Section 5 concludes. Auditors do not play any role in the going public process. Thus, with respect to the underpricing analysis, Big-four auditing represents only a strategic choice concerning disclosure policy, and Venture capital, a dummy variable indicating venture capital sponsorship: the strategic role of venture capital in IPOs and its concern with reputation has already been extensively discussed (Barry et al. 1990; and Megginson and Weiss, 1991) .
-Variables, data and sample

--Variables
Venture capital is also associated to firms' characteristics (e.g., young firms, technology industries and growth).
-Data and sample
Our dataset combines data from several sources. We define three periods: Pre-bubble (1991 ( -1996 ( ), Transition (1997 ( and 1998 Table 4 reports issuers' characteristics in three distinct periods pre-bubble (1991-1996) transition (1997 and 1998) and bubble (1999-2000) . It also compares pre-bubble to bubble periods. The general message of an increase from 33 to 36 percent. Finally, there was a decrease on pre-IPO acquisitions from 33 to 25 percent.
-Change in IPO characteristics
-Methodology
We conjecture that the high underpricing prevailing during the bubble can be fully accounted by issuers characteristics and strategic goals. To test this hypothesis, we run underpricing regressions controlling for the issues' characteristics, issuers' strategic characteristics, and underwriting. Our econometric model is:
where is a vector of characteristics of issue : technology, age, offer size, firm size, offerto-firm size, sales growth and the size of the price interval scaled by its middle point;
is a set of three dummy variables indicating pre-IPO acquisitions, Big-four auditing ( _ ) and VC-sponsorship; and is a dummy variable indicating that the Carter-Manaster reputation index is above 8.
In our basic setting, we do not control for the ex-ante demand for the IPO (price revision up and price revision down) because these variables are affected by underwriter's selling effort and the timing of the IPO. Nevertheless, for robustness purposes we also present estimations controlling for ex-ante demand.
If our conjecture is correct, interactions of the bubble dummy with our proxies for firms' strategic goals and characteristics fully explain the abnormal underpricing observed during the bubble; i.e., the coefficients on the bubble dummy and its interaction with top underwriting will not be statistically significant.
We also investigate alternatives explanations for Dotcom underpricing. To evaluate the Risk-composition hypothesis we use means comparison of the average quality between the bubble and pre-bubble IPO cohorts. We use direct and indirect measures. Our direct measure is the frequency of failures. As indirect measures we use: institutional ownership and its concentration (one would expect institutional investors to run away from bad quality firms, decreasing institutional ownership and increasing its Herfindahl index), certification by reputable underwriters and auditors, and enhanced tradability conditions (analysts' coverage and bid-ask spreads). We measure tradability conditions and institutional ownership at the end of the second year from the IPO. This allows for the effect of underwriter efforts at the IPO to wear out, minimizing the possibility that firms are badquality but look good under indirect measures because of underwriting effort.
There are two objections to the use of top underwriting and analysts' coverage as measure for quality during the bubble. First, Loughran and Ritter (2004) suggest that top underwriters increased market share by lowering their standards (we call this Underwriters' Opportunistic Behavior). If so, top underwriting would not signal quality. Second, the same authors conjecture that during the bubble, firms coped with underwriters with a reputation for severe underprice in exchange for analyst coverage (Analyst Lust). Therefore, analysts' coverage was related to underpricing and underwriting rather than issuer quality. We test these two possibilities using probit analysis on the choices of underwriters and analyst coverage. Our specification for these tests is:
where is either a dummy variable indicating Carter-Manaster index for underwriters' reputation above 8, or a dummy variable indicating analysts' coverage during the second year from the IPO; is a dummy variable indicating the bubble years (1999) (2000) ; is a vector of predetermined characteristics of issue : VC-sponsorship, Big-four auditing, high-growth, pre-IPO acquisition, age, technology, firm size, offer size, offer-to-firm size and sales growth (in the analysis for analysts' coverage we also include underpricing, the top-underwriting dummy and their interactions with the bubble dummy); and is a set of 9 industry dummies. 
If the
-Results
We conjecture that the high underpricing prevailing during the bubble is fully accounted by issuers' characteristics and strategic goals rather than underwriter's behavior. Table 5 investigates underpricing during the bubble (Model 2). Regression 1 includes only the usual controls plus the Bubble dummy. 5 The coefficient on the bubble dummy is 0.358 (35.8 percent) with statistical significance at the one percent level. Thus, the increase in underpricing during the bubble is not fully explained by change in firms' characteristics.
Notice that the coefficients on the dummies for VC, Big-four, High-growth, Acquisition pre-IPO and Young are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level.
Regression 2 includes the interaction between top-underwriting and the bubble dummies. Now the coefficient on the Bubble dummy drops to 0.249 that is significant at the one percent level. The coefficient on the interaction is 0.137 that is significant at the 5 We do not include controls for the ex-ante demand because they could be correlated to the bubble itself.
10% level, suggesting that part of the underpricing incurred during the bubble was due to the action of top underwriters. This result is similar to that of Loughran and Ritter (2004). 6 Regression 3 examines the effect of VC sponsorship and pre-IPO acquisitions during the bubble on underpricing. The interaction of VC and bubble dummies has coefficient of 0.273 that is statistically significant at the one percent level indicating that VC sponsored firms bore additional 27.3 percent underpricing. Similarly, the interaction with the acquisition dummy has coefficient of 0.213 that is statistically significant at the one percent level. The coefficients on the bubble dummy drops to 0.074 and that on its interaction with top underwriting to 0.087. Both coefficients lose statistical significance.
Thus, the underpricing during the bubble can be fully accounted by the behavior of VC and pre-IPO acquiring firms. Notice that once we include the interaction of VC and bubble dummies, the coefficient on VC loses statistical significance. Therefore, out of the bubble period VC sponsorship does not affect underpricing. Distinctively, the coefficient on Acquisition pre-IPO remains statistically significant at the 10 percent level, even though its magnitude drops from 0.072 to 0.023.
Regression 4 includes additionally the interaction between the bubble and Big-four dummy. The coefficient on such interaction is 0.217 that is statistically significant at the one percent level. Notice that now the coefficient on the bubble dummy becomes negative but still non-significant. The inclusion of this interaction does not change the magnitudes of the coefficients on the interactions of VC and Acquisition pre-IPO.
It is possible that our three strategic variables also have a selection component. For instance, VC-sponsored firms are frequently young, focused on technology and belong to high-growth industries. In order to disentangle these two components, regression 5 includes interactions between the bubble dummy and the three dummies for firms' characteristics (high-growth, technology and young). All of these interactions bear coefficients near 15 percent that are statistically significant at the five or 10 percent levels. Now the coefficient on the interaction of the bubble and VC dummies drops from 0.27 (Regressions 3 and 4) to 0.18, but remains statistically significant at the one percent level. This means that from the 6 We note that these authors did not include in their analysis any other interaction with the bubble dummy.
27 percent extra underpricing bore by VC-sponsored firms, only 9 percent was due to their characteristics. The magnitude of the coefficient on the interactions between the Acquisition pre-IPO, Big-four and bubble dummies are only marginally affected by firms' characteristics, suggesting that the Acquisition pre-IPO and Big-four variables capture only strategic behavior.
Regression 6 drops the bubble dummy to include its interaction with the Non-top underwriting dummy. The coefficient on the interaction with the top-underwriting dummy becomes negative (-0.077) but still fails to present statistical significance (t-statistics is -1.13). Regression 7, for robustness purposes, includes controls for the ex-ante demand (price revision up and price revision down). The coefficient on the bubble dummy becomes -0.173 that is statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The coefficient on the interaction of the bubble and top-underwriting dummies remain positive but without statistical significance (t-statistics is 1.10).
As robustness, we also run quantile on underpricing ( 
-Robustness
-Risk-Composition Hypothesis
We will now discuss some robustness tests that consider alternative theories for the market's bubble behavior. We start with the Risk Composition hypothesis (RCH) that assumes that issuers' quality decreased during the bubble period. We now investigate changes in issuers' quality.
One of the main evidences supporting RCH is the increased rate of failure (delisting due to bankruptcy or drop reasons) within the first five years from the IPO (Yung, Colak and Wang; 2008) . We look at the evolution of failure rates over a period of 15 (Table 6 ).
Compared to the pre-bubble period, failure rate within three years from the IPO during the bubble is almost three times bigger: 14.7 vs. 5.3 percent (difference statistically significant at the one percent level). Within five years, it is almost twice: 18.6 vs. there is no evidence of higher failure rates during the bubble in the long run. Table 7 also reports the difference in failure rates across highly and lowly underpriced IPOs during the bubble. If underpricing is related to drop in quality, highly underpriced IPOs should be associated increases failure rate. We find just the opposite.
Failure rate remains five to seven percent lower for highly underpriced IPO regardless of the time horizon (difference always statistically significant at the one percent level). Thus, failure rate seems negatively related to underpricing.
We also look at indirect quality measures: bid-ask spreads at the end of the second year from the IPO and analysts' coverage at the end of the first year, and institutional ownership and its Herfindahl index at the end of the second year from the IPO (Table 8) .
Bid-ask spreads decreased from 4.2 to 3.2 percent and were considerably lower for highly underpriced firms: 2.4 vs. 3.9 percent. Analysts' coverage increased from 70 to 76 percent and was higher among highly underpriced IPOs: 80 vs. 73 percent. Institutional ownership was constant at 33 percent over both pre-bubble and bubble periods and it was slightly lower for highly underpriced IPOs: 31 vs. 34 percent (difference statistically significant at the 10 percent level). Similarly, the Herfindahl index was constant at 0.21 across periods and slightly lower for highly underpriced IPOs: 0.20 vs. 0.22 (no statistical difference).
Thus, once more we find no evidence for drop in quality or than high underpricing is associated to lower quality.
Finally, we run regression analysis to search for drop in quality associated to issuers characteristics (Table 9 ). Initially we focus on VC-sponsorship. VC bubble firms experienced lower bid-ask spreads and institutional ownership. There was no relative change in failure rate, analysts' coverage and the Herfindhal index for institutional ownership. Therefore, VC-sponsorship at the bubble implies a higher liquidity. Thus, there is no evidence of a decrease in quality for VC-sponsored issuers. For pre-IPO acquirers bidask spreads and institutional concentration decreased. Moreover, the failure among pre-IPO acquirers was so rare that the variable drops in failure regression. Consequently, apart from some evidence of industry concentration, all results point to an increase in quality. For issuers with Big-four auditing there was decreased failure rate, improved analyst coverage and institutional ownership, and lower institutional concentration. These results point towards an improvement in quality.
The only groups of firms for which we see any evidence of decrease in quality are technology and high-growth firms. Evidence is stronger for technology firms: there was an increase in the rate of failure, even though they had improved their liquidity (lower bid-ask spreads and higher analysts' coverage). High-growth firms experienced a reduction in institutional ownership and an increase in its concentration. For both technology and highgrowth firms there was an indication of sector consolidation, with higher likelihood of becoming an M&A target.
Contrary to what one could expect, there is no evidence of any change in quality for young issuers during the bubble. Issuers that went public earlier in their life cycle during the bubble were equally good as their predecessors. This result goes against the idea that during the bubble firms were speeding up their IPOs to time the market and exploit investors' gullibility.
Overall, the evidence of a decrease in the quality of issuers seems weak. In particular, there is no evidence of deterioration in quality among VC-sponsored, acquiring, audited by Big-four or young companies. This leaves little room for a demand-driven explanation for the high underpricing.
--Change in underwriters' certification
Certification increased during the bubble (Table 4 ). The proportion of top underwriting increased from 68 to 84 percent (difference significant at the one percent level). This led Loughran and Ritter (2004) to raise concern as top underwriting as measure of quality. Accordingly, the increase in top-underwriting during the bubble was due to top underwriters' opportunistic behavior to increase market share. We address such concern by running probit analysis on the probability of top underwriting (Model 5). Regressions 1-3 in Table 9 report marginal effects. Regression 1 includes only predetermined characteristics of issues. Top underwriting is more likely for VC-sponsored, technology and large firms, and for large offerings (in terms of absolute and relative size). Regression 2 includes a dummy variable for the bubble period. The marginal effect of the bubble dummy is -0.160
(statistically significant at the one percent level). Thus, the likelihood of any firm hiring a top underwriter fell by 16.0 percent during the bubble. Finally, Regression 3 also controls for issuers' strategic goals. The marginal effect of the bubble dummy remains the same both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. In short, our results reject the idea of underwriters' opportunism. In fact, top underwriters became more selective. The increase in top underwriting during the bubble was due to the raise in the proportion of firms with the fit for it.
-Change in analysts' coverage
Loughran and Ritter (2004) suggest that during the bubble some firms coped with high underpricing to obtain analysts' coverage (Analyst Lust). We investigate such conjecture by running probit analysis on analysts' coverage (Model 5). Regressions 4-6 in 
-Conclusion
We conjecture that the Dotcom high underpricing was consequence of the emergence of a large cohort of firms racing for market leadership. Our empirical findings support our conjecture. We begin by showing that the abnormally high underpricing observed during the bubble can be fully accounted by issuers' characteristics and strategic purposes. The strategic dimensions we consider were firms that were doing acquisitions, sought Big-four auditing, and had VC sponsorship. The issuers associated with high underpricing were high-growth, technology and young. When one controls for these characteristics, it emerges that the abnormally high underpricing is not related to underwriters' behavior.
We also run some checks on alternative conjectures for Dotcom underpricing. We show that during the bubble there was no decrease in the quality of the average issuer. In fact, there is indication that quality increased. For example, we find that the tradability conditions and certification improve during the bubble. Finally, in order to reconcile our result with the previous literature, we show that the increase in failure rate previously reported in the literature prevailed only in the short-run. However, the mid-and long-run failure rates are not different for the bubble and pre-bubble IPO cohorts. Furthermore, we observe that highly underpriced firms presented better quality than low-underpriced ones.
Therefore, our evidence goes against the Risk Composition Hypothesis.
By examining the determinants of top underwriting an analysts' coverage we found that underwriters and analysts became more selective during the bubble. Controlling for firms' characteristics, the likelihood of obtaining top underwriting fell by near 15 percent, while that of analysts' coverage fell by near three percent. Top underwriting and analysts' coverage increased during the bubble because of the increase in the proportion of firms with the fit for them. This evidence is contrary to the Analyst Lust Conjecture and to the idea that top underwriters took advantage of the moment to increase their market share.
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Table 4 Characteristics of Sample across Periods
Underpricing: first trading day closing price relative to the offer price; Age: IPO year minus founding year; Firm size: book value of assets in the last financial report before the IPO; Technology: dummy variable indicating technology industries as defined in Loughran and Ritter (2004) ; Sales growth: geometric average of quarterly sales growth during the last three quarters before the IPO (or available period, if less); High-growth: dummy variable indicating quarterly sales growth above 100%; Offer size: filled amount in the IPO prospectus; and Top underwriting: dummy variable indicating that the Carter-Manaster index for the member of the underwriting syndicate with the highest score is bigger than 8. Number of firms with the attribute and t-statistics are in parentheses. *, ** and *** to denote statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1percent levels (in boldface). 
Period
